The effect of market power thus fades away quickly without uncertainty, where the Courot price tends to marginal cost at the rate of 1/n and the deadweight loss decreases at the rate of 1/n2. Productive inefficiency is of the same order.4 The result also holds under private information because the same forces are at work. In both cases (with full information and with private information), market power affects the deadweight loss by decreasing expected output and by making firms too insensitive to their costs. The result is that both allocative and productive inefficiency are impaired (and by the same order of magnitude). When there is no market power difference, expected prices are the same independent of the information regime. Differences in information are of a different order because they are driven by variance terms. This is so because in a private information regime, a firm has to estimate the sample mean of cost parameters (the average cost of active firms). It follows then that information is aggregated at the rate associated to the law of large numbers, as the sample mean of i.i.d. cost parameters converges to its population mean, and this rate is 1/x/n. Simulations with the model show that there is a critical i, below 10 for a wide range of parameter values and significant uncertainty, such that the effect of private information dominates the effect of market power if and only if n > h. This critical h is decreasing in the prior variability of the cost parameters.
The results have positive and normative implications for Courot markets with increasing marginal costs. On the positive side, for large enough markets to approximate the market outcome, forgetting market power turns out to be much better than forgetting the effect of private information. On the normative side, the results suggest that in large enough Cournot markets, private information is a more important source of deadweight loss than market power. The analysis also provides a potential explanation for the low estimates typically obtained in the approximation of Harberger's triangles.
The plan of the rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the free-entry Coumot market with private information. Section 3 characterizes equilibria in the four regimes considered. Section 4 shows that the rate of convergence of prices to marginal costs is driven by the effect of private information and not market power (Proposition 2). Section 5 states a welfare property of the Bayesian price-taking mechanism, decomposes the deadweight loss at the market outcome into private information and market power terms, and presents the welfare counterpart of Proposition 2 (Proposition 4). Section 6 develops implications for competition policy, and Section 7 deals with some extensions. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
An independent-values Cournot market with free entry *
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with m consumers, each with quasi-linear preferences and maximizing the net benefit function U(x) -px with U(x) = ax -,x2/2, where a > 0 and ,6 > 0 and x is the consumption level. This gives rise to the inverse demand given by Pm(X) = a -flmX, where X is total output and Bm = -P/m. The parameter m measures the size of the market.
There are potentially many firms that may enter the market. If firm i enters, it produces according to a quadratic cost function C(xi; Oi) = Oixi + (A/2)x2, where Oi is a random parameter and X > 0. The Oi's parameters are i.i.d. with finite mean 0 and variance 2o-(and this is common knowledge as well as all other parameters in the model).
Entry is modelled as a two-stage game. At the first stage, firms decide whether to enter the market or not. If a firm decides to enter, it pays a fixed cost F > 0. At the second stage, each active firm i, upon observing a cost realization Oi, sets an output level.5
Given that n firms have entered, a Bayesian Coumot-Nash equilibrium (BNE) obtains.
4 See the results in Dasgupta and Ushio (1981) and Ushio (1983) , allowing for decreasing average costs; in Guesnerie and Hart (1985) , allowing for U-shaped costs, all in homogeneous-product models; and Vives (1999) for differentiated-products models. 5 Mankiw and Whinston (1986) study whether free-entry equilibria with no uncertainty entail too many firms from a welfare point of view. I will not pursue this line of enquiry in the presence of uncertainty and private information.
Suppose that parameters are such that for any cost realization, a firm wants to produce. (See the Appendix for parameter conditions.) Given our assumptions, for any n there is a unique BNE. This equilibrium is symmetric and linear, with firm i producing according to xn(Oi) = bn(a -0) -an(0i -0), with an = (X + 28m)-1, bn = (X + /3m(1 + n))-1. This yields expected profits Ern, = (Om + X/2) E(xn(0i))2 = (bn)2(a -_)2 + (an)2 2. A free-entry equilibrium is then a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game. Given a market of size m, the free-entry number of firms n*(m) is approximated by the solution to E 7n = F (provided F is not so large that no entry is profitable). It can be checked that n*(m) is of the same order as m. This means that the ratio of consumers to firms is bounded away from zero and infinity for any market size.6 For example, we could have n*(m) approximately equal to m/k, with k positive and typically large. For simplicity of exposition in the rest of the article, I index market size and the number of firms by n and consider n replica Cournot markets. We can think of consumer groups of size k and have the same number of firms and consumer groups. As n increases, the market grows large and firms become small in relation to the market. It should be understood, however, that the basic exogenous parameter is market size, with the number of firms adjusting with free entry.
Regimes and benchmarks

*
Consider thus an n replica market. I denote the average of a variable by a tilde. For example, the average or per-capita output is xn = X/n. The profit of firm i is therefore given by Tri = (a -Oi -,xn)xi -(A/2)x/2, total surplus by TS = nU(X/n) ->i C(xi;0i), and per-capita surplus by TS/n = U(X/n) -(.i C(xi; 0i))/n. Without loss of generality and for most of the rest of the article, I let ,B = 1. I shall consider four possible regimes according to whether firms are strategic or not and according to whether cost information is private or public (full information). The two strategic regimes are the Bayesian Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the private-information game and the full-information Cournot equilibrium. The Bayesian Coumot-Nash equilibrium is taken to be the market outcome; the other regimes are benchmarks for the analysis. The two nonstrategic regimes are the Bayesian price-taking equilibrium (with private information) and the standard competitive equilibrium (with full information). Those regimes are obviously not realistic, since despite there being a finite number of firms, they do not realize that they have market power. For example, at the Bayesian price-taking equilibrium, firms do not take into account any influence of their actions on the price ("price taking"), which they have to estimate with their private information ("Bayesian").7
Variables in the nonstrategic regimes are denoted by the superscript c ("competitive"); variables in the full-information regimes are denoted by the superscript f ("full information"). Table 1 presents the different regimes and the corresponding notation for strategies. At private-information equilibria, the strategy of firm i depends only on its type Oi. At full-information equilibria, it will depend on the realization of all types, which given the structure of the model can be summarized by (0i, On), where 0n = (1/n) En= Oj.
It is easy to check that there exists a unique (and symmetric) equilibrium in each regime. The equilibrium is linear in the information firms have. At the strategic BNE (Section 2), the firm realizes the effect of its output on the market price, equating expected marginal revenue with marginal cost MC(xi; Oi) = Oi + Xxi. At the Bayesian price-taking equilibrium, the firm does not perceive any influence of its output on the (random) price and equates the expected price with marginal cost: E(p I Oi) = MC(xi; Oi). At the full information Coumot equilibrium, a firm equates marginal revenue to marginal cost, and at the full information price-taking equilibrium, the firm equates price to marginal cost, p = MC(xi; i). Given linearity, prices will depend on 
Market power and information aggregation in large markets
*
The following proposition characterizes the convergence of the BNE price to the fullinformation competitive equilibrium price as the market grows large and decomposes its rate into market-power and private-information effects. We will say that the sequence of random variables Yn converges to zero at the rate 1 / /n (or Yn is of the order 1/ /n) if E(Yn)2 converges to zero at the rate l/nr (or E(Yn)2 is of the order 1/nr). For example, given that E(Yn)2 = (E Yn)2 + var Yn, a sequence Yn, such that E Yn = 0 and var Yn is of the order of 1/n, converges to zero at the rate 1/Vn. This is the typical convergence rate for the sample mean to converge to the population mean associated with the law of large numbers.9 In particular, On -0 is of order 1/JI because var n = ar/n. Proposition 2. As the market grows large, the market price (at the BNE) Pn converges to the full-information competitive price p f at the rate of 1 / n/. This "slow" convergence is driven by the rate at which information is aggregated (1/x/n) and not by the rate at which market power is dissipated (1/n).
Consider the decomposition Pn -p = pn -p + p -p. The market-power difference (keeping information private) Pn -= E(pn -) + (a n inherits the order of the expected price difference E(pn -pC), which is 1/n because (an -ac) is of lower order than 1/n. The information difference (with price-taking behavior) pc -pn = (ac -bc)(0n -0) is of the order of 1/ /n because (an -bc) is of the order of a constant. The interaction between both effects is negative (E{(pn -pC)(pn -PnC)} < 0) and of the same order as the market-power term.'0 This means that the difference Pn -pfc will inherit the order 1/v/ of pC -pfC, which is higher than the order 1/n of Pn -pC. A parallel analysis establishes the same result for the alternative decomposition Pn -pn = Pn -f + Pn pC. Now pn -pf is of the order 1//n (information) and pf -pfC is of the order 1/n (market power).
The intuition for the result is the following. The order of Pn -pC or pn -pn is driven by the difference in expected values, whereas the order of pC -pC or n -p is driven by the variance of the price difference (because expected prices are the same when there is no difference in market power). The difference in expected prices between a strategic and a price-taking regime (be it with privae , , r ith fullprivate information, Pn -pC , is of the order of 1/n as in markets with no uncertainty and is explained by the rate at which market power disappears. Indeed, with full information it is immediate from the first-order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium that Pf-( MC, (xf;oi)) /n fi 1/ It follows that the order of magnitude of the margin over average marginal cost is 1/n provided the elasticity of demand r] is bounded away from zero and infinity. The variance of the price difference keeping market power constant, pC -pfC (price taking) or Pn -p (Cournot), is driven by the discrepancy between the sample mean and the population mean of the cost parameters, On -0, which is of the order of 1 / \/n. A firm in a private-information regime has to estimate the market price (price-taking case) or residual demand (Cournot case), which depends on the average realization of the cost parameter, and his strategy will depend only on his cost realization (and the known population mean). In contrast, with full information the strategy of a firm depends on both his cost realization and on the average realization of the cost parameter.
Welfare *
Welfare characterization of market equilibria. Let us start by providing a general welfare characterization of a Cournot market with private information allowing for a general information structure (there will be more on this in Section 7). Consider an n-firm Coumot market with smooth inverse downward-sloping demand P(X) and smooth convex costs, C(xi; i) for firm i. Suppose that firm i receives a private signal si about Oi. The following result provides an analogue to the First Welfare Theorem for Bayesian price-taking equilibria. We say that firms use decentralized strategies if each firm can choose its output as a function only of its signal.
Proposition 3. In a Cournot private-information environment, Bayesian price-taking equilibria maximize expected total surplus (ETS) subject to the use of decentralized production strategies. We will be interested in the differences in terms of (per-capita) ETS in the different regimes. The following result for a linear-quadratic specification of the model (with P linear and C quadratic) will prove useful. Lemma 1. In the linear-quadratic specification of the model, the difference in (per-capita) ETS between a price-taking regime, R = fc or R = c, and another regime with strategies based on weakly less information (that is, any other with respect to fc and BNE with respect to c) is given by (ETSR -ETS)/n = (5 E( -R)2 + ( E(xin -2/n))/2.
The result follows considering a Taylor series expansion of TS (stopping at the second term due to the quadratic nature of the payoff) around price-taking equilibria (R = fc or R = c). The key to simplifying the computations is to notice that at price-taking equilibria, total surplus is maximized. Note that if the strategies and the information structure are symmetric, then E(xin -xR)2 is independent of i and therefore Ei E(xin -xi)2/n = E(xin -xR)2
We can decompose the total inefficiency with respect to price-taking regime R in allocative and productive inefficiency. The latter is associated with the production of an average output in a non-cost-minimizing way, the former with the loss in surplus when producing, in a costminimizing way, an average output different from the benchmark. Consider, for simplicity of notation, a symmetric information structure and strategies. When average outputs xn and X, are Similarly, in the private-information case the order of magnitude of both allocative and productive inefficiency with respect to the Bayesian price-taking equilibrium (or decentralized team solution) is 1/n2. Indeed, the deadweight loss due to allocative inefficiency is given by (j8+X)E(xn -xc)2/2 and the loss due to productive inefficiency by X var{(xni -Xn)-(xCi -xc)}/2.12 Both are of the order 1/n2, and this implies that (ETSn -ETSn)/n is of the order l/n2. In the cases of both full and private information, market power affects the deadweight loss not only by decreasing expected output (because bn = bf < bn = bf c) but also by making firms too insensitive to their costs (respectively, an < ac and af < afC). Both allocative and productive inefficiency are impaired by the same order of magnitude.
When differences in information are at stake, keeping market power constant, the deadweight loss is driven by the variance terms because expected output does not change when comparing 19 Asymmetric cost information is an obstacle that even a legal cartel, in which side payments are possible, has to confront because production has to be allocated efficiently among cartel members (see Cramton and Palfrey (1990) and Kihlstrom and Vives (1992) ). 20 However, the cost of not communicating may be productive inefficiency. With price competition it might be that this effect outweighs the price-reduction potential of the lack of communication. The reason is that colluding firms may have an ample tolerance of productive inefficiency before lowering prices. Athey and Bagwell conjecture nonetheless that this conclusion may not hold with competition a la Cournot. ? RAND 2002. number of firms in the market. At the same time, sharing cost information in a static Cournot model improves welfare (as we have seen before; see also Vives (1984) and Shapiro (1986)). As a consequence, there is a tension between the collusion concern and the static efficiency benefits. Disallowing the exchange of cost information may come at a cost. The question then is how to devise a rule of thumb for policy absent a complete (and costly) estimate of the potential benefits of information sharing.
We have seen how, for a given degree of cost uncertainty, there is a critical number of firms, hi(a 2), with h decreasing in o02, such that for n larger (smaller) than h the welfare loss derived from the lack of information aggregation is larger (smaller) than the welfare loss derived from market power. This critical n is not very large, between 5 and 10 firms, for a wide range of parameter values. Therefore, the relative benefit of letting firms share cost information is large unless the number of firms is small. This suggests a safe-haven policy for information exchange on costs: It should be allowed in not very concentrated markets. In concentrated markets, the potential for collusion should be assessed, and if it is deemed high, the information exchange should be disallowed. A more drastic (and easier-to-implement) policy would call for a ban on cost information sharing in concentrated markets because the potential static efficiency gain is not large and the collusive potential significant.
The question then arises whether firms have incentives to reveal or share their cost information if this is allowed, and, if not, what measures can be taken to facilitate information exchange. In the Cournot market with independent costs, it is a dominant strategy to share ex ante information. That is, if firms can commit to share information before receiving their signals, they will do it (Fried, 1984; Shapiro, 1986; and Raith, 1996) . A trade association may provide the mechanism to ex ante share information. But information about costs may be exchangeable in practice only at the interim stage-that is, after each firm learns its cost level but does not know the costs of the rival firms. In this case, if information is not verifiable and there are no other signalling possibilities, no information revelation is possible. The reason is that all types of firms would like to be perceived as being of a low-cost type. With verifiable information, full revelation obtains (Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990). This happens because the least-cost firm will reveal itself credibly and then all other types unravel. A way to promote information sharing therefore would be to facilitate the verification of information via "benchmarking" or the formation of trade associations that can audit and check the information reported by their members.21
Information could also be revealed with costly signalling, be it in the form of wasteful advertising (Ziv, 1993) , for example, or with dynamic competition in which production levels are observable (Mailath, 1989) . Then dynamic interaction may reveal part or all of it over time (depending on whether separating or semi-pooling equilibria obtain; see Vives (1999) . This suggests that the welfare loss from incomplete information might dissipate while the one derived from market power remains. This type of dynamic revelation applies when costs change slowly or, in the extreme, for once-and-for-all shocks. In other situations, however, the types of firms change each period following a stochastic process, and the revelation of today's cost parameter provides only an estimate of tomorrow's cost. In the steady state, then, the welfare loss due to private information will remain significant. 
Extensions
*
We have considered an independent-values linear Courot model. How far do the results extend to other specifications? We will consider relaxing, in turn, linearity, the information structure, the product structure, and the market microstructure. We will deal finally with the policy implications.
[ Linearity. I have restricted the analysis to cases in which, in equilibrium, all firms wish to produce. This is not the case, for example, with constant marginal costs. Then, as the number of firms grows, only the more efficient firms can survive. This means that we have not allowed for the selection effect of competition weeding out inefficient firms (Demsetz, 1973) . It is an open question to assess the relative importance of market power versus information aggregation in this case. One can conjecture that, if anything, convergence to the first best will be slowed down because now productive inefficiency may loom larger at the market outcome.
Furthermore, I have assumed a linear structure to derive the results. However, the results should be extendible to a nonlinear frame. The reason is as follows. Our linear-quadratic payoff could be seen as an approximation to a general payoff (up to the second order). With this perspective, a version of Lemma 1 to compute welfare differences across regimes should hold (stopping the Taylor approximation at the second order), and similar results could, hopefully, be derived. Nonetheless, the approximation need not be good for a small number of firms unless the variance is low. D Information structure. In a Cournot market, information aggregation does not obtain asymptotically outside the independent-values case except under very special parameter configurations. For example, it does obtain with common-value uncertainty and constant marginal costs under some regularity conditions of the signal structure (Palfrey, 1985) , but it does not obtain with increasing marginal costs (Vives, 1988) . In general, with common values or with private values, as the market grows large, the BNE does not converge to the (full-information) competitive equilibrium. However, the BNE does converge to price-taking behavior, and this represents the best possible decentralized mechanism. According to Proposition 3, price-taking behavior maximizes ETS subject to the use of decentralized strategies (it is "second-best efficient"). where h(0) is the hazard rate of the distribution (the probability that the cost of a rival equals 0 given that it is no less than 0), with an appropriate boundary condition. Under standard boundedness conditions, pn(0) -0 will be of the order of 1/n and therefore so will the margin of the winning firm Pn(min) -0min. Given that Pn(0) is increasing, there is no productive inefficiency; the lowestcost firm supplies the market. Furthermore, the deadweight loss due to allocative inefficiency is of the order of 1/n2. The winner-take-all nature of competition implies that the equilibrium strategy depends on (n -1)h(0), that is, on the probability that, conditional on having the lowest cost, a rival also has the lowest cost. The higher this probability, the lower the margin, ceteris paribus. The firm conditions on its cost realization and on the event of winning the contest. One can draw an analogy with supply function competition (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989) , where a firm submits a supply function effectively conditioning on the information contained in the market price. The consequence is that in the auction/Bertrand game a firm is effectively conditioning on more information than in the Cournot game. In the latter, a firm has to estimate the average cost of (active) rivals and relies only on its cost realization. The auction/Bertrand mechanism better aggregates information than the Cournot one, and this explains the different rates at which prices converge to marginal cost in the presence of incomplete information. o Policy implications. In what directions is the competition policy recommendation robust? It is robust if competition is a la Coumot. This is so because information sharing on costs (or demand) is good for welfare with Coumot competition independent of whether uncertainty is of the private or common-value variety (see Vives, 1999) . However, things get more complicated with Bertrand competition. Then information sharing tends to be bad for welfare, with the exception of the common-value cost uncertainty case. For example, in the price competition model of of the last subsection, the deadweight loss is larger under full than under incomplete information (Hansen, 1988) . That is, contrary to the Cournot case, we have that ETSf < ETSn. The reason is that with incomplete information a firm tends to be more aggressive and sets a price below the 24 Note also that switching the role of prices and quantities and letting ,/ < 0, we obtain a Bertrand model with product differentiation and idiosyncratic demand uncertainty. Then the demand for product i is given by xi = a -Oi -(X/2)pi -fp, where p is the average price and products are gross substitutes (and competition of the strategic complements variety) because / < 0. expected price with complete information. The result is that P(0min) < E(Onext I 0min)-25 When we couple the above with the result in Athey and Bagwell (2001) that restricting communication about i.i.d. costs may be harmful to welfare when firms compete in prices and try to collude (because productive efficiency is impaired), we are left with no simple policy bottom line.
Leaving aside the winner-take-all case of auctions, where even with a few players the deadweight loss is small, what is a robust result is that, with significant uncertainty and private information, the welfare consequences of information exchange dominate those of market power in moderately sized and large markets.26
